Commonwealth Science and Industrial Research Organisation

Green Army: Research and Development

Figure 7.1.1
The projected temperature range [for Australia] by 2090 shows larger differences between RCPs, with

• 0.6 to 1.7 °C for RCP2.6,
• 1.4 to 2.7 °C for RCP4.5 and
• 2.8 to 5.1 °C for RCP8.5. …

Median projected temperature increases [for RCP8.5] are typically 4°C by 2090, while those in the north-east and far south are 3°C or less.
(CCIA Technical Report, 2015, p 91-2)

Table 7.1.2 (Adapted): Projected number of days over 35°C in Australian capital cities (CCIA Technical Report, 2015, p 98)
	1995	2030	2090
		RCP4.5	RCP4.5	RCP8.5
Perth	28.0	36.0	43.0	63.0
Adelaide	20.0	26.0	32.0	47.0
Brisbane (Amberley)	12.0	18.0	27.0	55.0
Darwin	11.0	43.0	111.0	265.0
Melbourne	11.0	13.0	16.0	24.0
Canberra	7.1	12.0	17.0	29.0
Sydney	3.1	4.3	6.0	11.0
Hobart	1.6	2.0	2.6	4.2

Australian Climate Variability and Change

By 2030, Australian annual average temperature is projected to increase by 0.6-1.3°C above the climate of 1986–2005 under RCP4.5 with little difference between RCPs.
The projected temperature range by 2090 shows larger differences between RCPs, with

• 0.6 to 1.7°C for RCP2.6,
• 1.4 to 2.7°C for RCP4.5 and
• 2.8 to 5.1°C for RCP8.5.

(p 91)

Extreme fire weather days have increased at 24 out of 38 Australian sites from 1973-2010, due to warmer and drier conditions.
(p 8)

A recent analysis of northern hemisphere heatwaves has shown

• that very hot summers have increased in frequency approximately 10 fold since the 1950s, and
• that a number of recent summer heatwaves (such as the European 2003 and Moscow 2010 heatwaves) have been so extreme that their probability of occurrence without global warming would be close to zero.

(p 33)

[Greenhouse] gas concentrations [may] end up being larger than those assumed under the RCP8.5 scenario [+2.6 to 4.8 °C relative to 1986–2005].
Higher values might arise through the release of carbon dioxide or methane to the atmosphere from, for example, thawing permafrost from Arctic and sub-Arctic peat bogs over the 21st century.
Some thawing has already occurred over Alaska, Canada and northern Russia and further thawing is expected.
However, the magnitude of the increase in emissions from thawing over the 21st century is very uncertain.
(p 34)

Australia will warm substantially during the 21st century

There is very high confidence in continued increases of mean, daily minimum and daily maximum temperatures throughout this century for all regions in Australia.
The magnitude of the warming later in the century is strongly dependent on the emission scenario.

Warming will be

• large compared to natural variability in the near future (2030) (high confidence), and
• very large compared to natural variability late in the century (2090) under RCP8.5 (very high confidence). …

Mean warming is projected to be greater than average in inland Australia, and less in coastal areas, particularly in southern coastal areas in winter.
(p 91)

More frequent and hotter hot days and fewer frost days are projected

Projected warming will result in

• more frequent and hotter hot days and warmer cold extremes (very high confidence) and
• reduced frost (high confidence).

Hot days are projected to occur more frequently.
For example, in Perth, the average number of days per year above 35°C or above 40°C by 2090 is projected to be 50% greater than present under RCP4.5.
The number of days above 35°C in Adelaide also increases by about 50% by late in the century, while the number of days above 40°C more than doubles.

Locations where frost occurs only a few times a year under current conditions are projected to become nearly frost-free by 2030.
Under RCP8.5 coastal areas are projected to be free of frost by 2090 while frost is still projected to occur inland.
(p 95)

Cool-season rainfall is projected to decline in southern Australia; changes are uncertain elsewhere

Southern Australia

Cool season (winter and spring) rainfall is projected to decrease (high confidence), though little change or increases in Tasmania in winter are projected (medium confidence).
The winter decline may be as great as 50% in south-western Australia in the highest emission scenario (RCP8.5) by 2090.
The direction of change in summer and autumn rainfall in southern Australia cannot be reliably projected, but there is medium confidence in a decrease in south-western Victoria in autumn and in western Tasmania in summer.


Eastern Australia

There is high confidence that in the near future (2030), natural variability will predominate over trends due to greenhouse gas emissions.
For late in the century (2090), there is medium confidence in a winter rainfall decrease.


Northern Australia and northern inland areas

There is high confidence that in the near future (2030) natural variability will predominate over trends due to greenhouse gas emissions.
There is low confidence in the direction of future rainfall change for late in the century (2090), but substantial changes to wet-season and annual rainfall cannot be ruled out.
(p 99)

Extreme rain events are projected to become more intense

Extreme rainfall events (wettest day of the year and wettest day in 20 years) are projected to increase in intensity with high confidence.
Confidence is reduced to medium confidence for south-western Western Australia, where the reduction in mean rainfall may be so strong as to significantly weaken this tendency.
(p 115)

In a warming climate, the atmosphere can hold more water vapour, around 7% more for every degree of global warming.
(p 33)

Time in drought is projected to increase in southern Australia, with a greater frequency of severe droughts

The time in drought is projected to increase over southern Australia with high confidence, consistent with the projected decline in mean rainfall.
Time in drought is projected to increase with medium or low confidence in other regions.
The nature of droughts is also projected to change with a greater frequency of extreme droughts, and less frequent moderate to severe drought projected for all regions (medium confidence).
(p 119)

Snowfall in the australian alps is projected to decrease, especially at low elevations

There is very high confidence that as warming progresses there will be a decrease in snowfall, an increase in snowmelt and thus reduced snow cover.
These trends will be large compared to natural variability and most evident at low elevations.
(p 123)

Mean wind speeds are projected to decrease in southern mainland Australia in winter and increase in Tasmania

By 2030, changes in near-surface wind speeds are projected to be small compared to natural variability (high confidence).

By 2090,

• wind speeds are projected to decrease in southern mainland Australia in winter (high confidence) and south-eastern mainland Australia in autumn and spring.
  Winter decreases are not expected to exceed 10 % under RCP8.5.
• Wind speed is projected to increase in winter in Tasmania.

Projected changes in extreme wind speeds are generally similar to those for mean wind.
(p 125)

Tropical cyclones may occur less often, become more intense, and may reach further south

Tropical cyclones are projected to become less frequent with a greater proportion of high intensity storms (stronger winds and greater rainfall) (medium confidence).
A greater proportion of storms may reach south of 25 degrees South (low confidence).

Mid-latitude weather systems are projected to shift south in winter and the tropics to expand southward

The observed intensification of the subtropical ridge and expansion of the Hadley Cell circulation are projected to continue in the 21st century (high confidence).
Both represent an expansion of the tropics.
(p 129)

More sunshine is projected in winter and spring

There is high confidence in little change in solar radiation over Australia in the near future (2030).
Late in the century (2090), there is medium confidence in an increase in winter and spring in southern Australia.
The increases in southern Australia may exceed 10% by 2090 under RCP8.5.
(p 131)

Lower relative humidity

Relative humidity is projected to decline in inland regions and where rainfall is projected to decline.
By 2030, the decreases are relatively small (high confidence).
By 2090,there is high confidence that humidity will decrease in winter and spring as well as annually, and there is medium confidence in declining relative humidity in summer and autumn.
(p 133)

Higher evaporation rates

There is high confidence in increasing potential evapotranspiration (atmospheric moisture demand) closely related to local warming, although there is only medium confidence in the magnitude of change.
(p 134)

Soil moisture is projected to decrease and future runoff will decrease where rainfall is projected to decrease

There is high confidence in decreasing soil moisture in the southern regions (particularly in winter and spring) driven by the projected decrease in rainfall and higher evaporative demand.
There is medium confidence in decreasing soil moisture elsewhere in Australia where evaporative demand is projected to increase but the direction of rainfall change is uncertain.

Decreases in runoff are projected with high confidence in south-western Western Australia and southern South Australia, and with medium confidence in far south-eastern Australia, where future rainfall is projected to decrease.
The direction of change in future runoff in the northern half of Australia cannot be confidently projected because of the uncertainty in the direction of rainfall change.
(p 136)

In Southern Australia practically all models show a decrease [in annual runoff] by 2090, ranging from around zero to −30% and zero to −60% under RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, respectively.
(p 138)

Southern and eastern Australia are projected to experience harsher fire weather; changes elsewhere are less certain

Projected warming and drying in southern and eastern Australia will lead to fuels that are drier and more ready-to-burn, with

• increases in the average forest fire danger index and
• a greater number of days with severe fire danger

(high confidence).

There is medium confidence that there will be little change in fire frequency in tropical and monsoonal northern Australia.
There is low confidence in projections of fire risk in the arid inland areas where fire risk is dependent on availability of fuel, which is driven by episodic rainfall.
(p 139)

Sea levels will continue to rise throughout the 21st century and beyond

In line with global mean sea level, Australian sea levels are projected to rise through the 21st century (very high confidence), and are very likely to rise at a faster rate during the 21st century than over the past four decades, or the 20th century as a whole, for the range of RCPs considered (high confidence).
Sea level projections for the Australian coastline by 2090 (the average of 2080 to 2100) are comparable to, or slightly larger than (by up to about 6 cm) the global mean sea level projections of

• 26-55 cm for RCP2.6 and
• 45-82 cm in RCP8.5 (medium confidence).

These ranges of sea level rise are considered likely (at least 66% probability), and that if a collapse in the marine based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet were initiated, the projections could be up to several tenths of a metre higher by late in the century.
Regional projections for 2100 (a single year) are not given because of the effect of interannual to decadal variability on regional sea levels.
However, for all scenarios, global averaged sea level in 2100 will be higher than in 2090 and sea level is projected to continue to rise beyond 2100.
(p 148)

Extreme sea levels will rise

Taking into account uncertainty in sea level rise projections and nature of extreme sea levels along the Australian coastline, an indicative extreme sea level ‘allowance’ is calculated.
This allowance is the minimum distance required to raise an asset to maintain current frequency of breaches under projected sea level rise. Along the Australian coast, these allowances are comparable to the upper end of the range of the respective sea level projections (medium confidence).
The main contribution to increasing extreme sea levels is from the rise in mean sea level (medium confidence).
Contributions to extreme sea levels from changes in weather events are projected to be small or negative (low confidence).
(p 153)

Oceans around Australia will warm

There is very high confidence that sea surface temperatures around Australia will rise, with the magnitude of the warming dependent on the RCP.
Near-coastal sea surface temperature rise around Australia is typically around 0.4-1.0°C by 2030 and around 2-4°C by 2090 under RCP8.5 compared to current (1986–2005). …

[Sea surface warming] off the east of Australia and Tasmania … has been 2 to 3 times faster than the global mean.
(p 157)

Ocean salinity may change

Changes in sea surface salinity reflect changes in rainfall and may affect ocean circulation and mixing.
A net reduction in the salinity of Australian coastal waters is projected, but this projection is of low confidence.
For some southern regions, models indicate an increase in sea surface salinity, particularly under higher emissions.
(p 160)

Oceans around Australia will become more acidic

There is very high confidence that around Australia the ocean will become more acidic, with a net reduction in pH.
There is also high confidence that the rate of ocean acidification will be proportional to the carbon dioxide emissions.
There is medium confidence

• that long-term viability of corals will be impacted under RCP8.5 and RCP4.5, and
• that there will be harm to marine ecosystems from the large reduction in pH under RCP8.5.

(p 162)

(Technical Report, Climate Change in Australia: Projections for Australia's National Resource Management Regions, 2015, emphasis added)

State of the Climate 2016

• Australia’s climate has warmed … by around 1 °C since 1910.
• The duration, frequency and intensity of extreme heat events have increased across large parts of Australia.
• There has been an increase in extreme fire weather, and a longer fire season, across large parts of Australia since the 1970s.
• May–July rainfall has reduced by around 19% since 1970 in the southwest of Australia. …
• Global average annual carbon dioxide levels are … likely the highest in the past two million years.
• 2015 was the warmest year on record for the globe since … 1880.
  The last 15 years are among the 16 warmest years on record.
• Globally-averaged ocean temperatures and heat content are increasing.
  Observations reveal this warming extends to at least [2 km] below the surface.
• Globally-averaged sea level has risen over 20 cm since the late 19th century, with about one third of this rise due to ocean warming and the rest from melting land ice and changes in the amount of water stored on the land.

(p 3)

The recent drying across southern Australia is the strongest recorded large-scale change in rainfall since national records began in 1900.
(p 10)

The impact of all greenhouse gases in the atmosphere combined can be expressed as an ‘equivalent CO2’ atmospheric concentration, which reached 487 ppm in 2015.
(p 19)

The global annual CO2 increase in 2015 was 3.0 ppm, the largest ever observed. …
During 2015 the rate of increase in fossil fuel emissions slowed.
However, the strong El Niño, which led to increased fires and associated greenhouse gas emissions, as well as a weakening of natural CO2 sinks through drought and reduced rainfall over large regions led to increased emissions from natural sources in 2015.
(p 20)

State of the Climate 2014

• {2013 was Australia’s warmest year on record …}
• Australia’s climate has warmed by 0.9°C since 1910 …
• Global mean temperature has risen by 0.85°C from 1880 to 2012. …

Atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations continue to rise and continued emissions will cause further warming over this century.
Limiting the magnitude of future climate change requires large and sustained net global reductions in greenhouse gases.
(p 3-4)

Australian Climate

Seven of the ten warmest years on record have occurred since 1998.

Over the past 15 years,

• the frequency of very warm months has increased five-fold and
• the frequency of very cool months has declined by around a third,

compared to 1951–1980. …

Since 2001, the number of extreme heat records in Australia has outnumbered extreme cool records by

• almost 3 to 1 for daytime maximum temperatures, and
• almost 5 to 1 for night-time minimum temperatures.

(p 5)

[Overall,] Australian average annual rainfall has increased since national records began in 1900, largely due to increases in rainfall from October to April, and most markedly across the northwest. …
[However, since] 1970 there has been a 17% decline in average winter rainfall in the southwest of Australia.
{In the far southwest, streamflow has declined by more than 50% since the mid-1970s.}

The southeast has experienced a 15% decline in late autumn and early winter rainfall since the mid-1990s, with a 25% reduction in average rainfall across April and May. …
[And in] the far southeast, streamflow during the 1997–2009 Millennium Drought was around half the long-term average.
(p 6)

Number of days each year where the Australian area-averaged daily mean temperature is above the 99th percentile for the period 1910–2013. …
This metric reflects the spatial extent of extreme heat across the continent and its frequency.
Half of these events have occurred in the past twenty years.

Recent studies examining heavy monthly to seasonal rainfall events that occurred in eastern Australia between 2010 and 2012 have shown that the magnitude of extreme rainfall is mostly explained by natural variability, with potentially a small additional contribution from global warming. …

The research on cyclone frequency in the Australian region is equivocal, with some studies suggesting no change and others a decrease in numbers since the 1970s.
(p 8-9)

Global Atmosphere and Cryosphere

• Ice-mass loss from the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets has accelerated over the past two decades.
• Arctic summer minimum sea-ice extent has declined by between 9.4 and 13.6% per decade since 1979, a rate that is likely unprecedented in at least the past 1,450 years.
• Antarctic sea-ice extent has slightly increased by between 1.2% and 1.8% per decade since 1979.

The mean estimated rate of ice loss from the Antarctic ice sheet has increased nearly five-fold

• from an estimated mean of 30 gigatonnes per year (Gt/yr) for the period from 1992 to 2001,
• to 147 Gt/yr for the period 2002 to 2011.

The rate of ice loss from the Greenland ice sheet has increased [more than six-fold] from 34 to 215 Gt/yr over the same period.

The average rate of ice loss from glaciers around the world, excluding glaciers on the periphery of the ice sheets, was

• very likely 226 Gt/yr over the period 1971 to 2009, and
• very likely 275 Gt/yr over the period 1993 to 2009. …

The [slight] increase in Antarctic sea-ice extent has been linked to several possible drivers, including

• freshening of surface waters due to increased precipitation and the enhanced melting of ice shelves, and
• changes in atmospheric circulation resulting in greater sea-ice dispersion.

(p 10)

Oceans

• Global mean sea level … in 2012 was 225 mm higher than in 1880. …
• Ocean acidity levels have increased [by 26% since 1750.]

Warming of the world’s oceans accounts for more than 90% of additional energy accumulated from the enhanced greenhouse effect …
The ocean today is warmer, and sea levels higher, than at any time since the instrumental record began.

• The upper layer of the ocean, from the surface to a depth of 700 metres, has increased its heat content by around 17 × 10^22 joules since 1971, accounting for around 63% of additional energy accumulated by the climate system.
• Warming below 700 metres over the same period accounts for approximately 30% of additional energy.
• The remaining 7% has been added to the cryosphere, atmosphere and land surface.

Change in ocean heat content (in joules) from the full ocean depth, from 1960 to present.
Shading provides an indication of the confidence range of the estimate.

(p 11)

Global sea level fell during the intense La Niña event of 2010–2011.
This was ascribed partly to the exceptionally high rainfall over land which resulted in floods in Australia, northern South America, and Southeast Asia.
[And] was compounded by the long residence time of water over inland Australia.
Recent observations show that sea levels have rebounded in line with the long-term trend.
(p 12)

Greenhouse Gases

• The increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations from 2011 to 2013 is the largest two-year increase ever observed.

Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions into the atmosphere in 2013 are … about 46% higher than in 1990.
Global CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuel are estimated to have increased in 2013 by 2.1% compared with the average of 3.1% per year from 2000 to 2012.
(p 13)

Global atmospheric CH4 … and N2O [concentrations] are at their highest levels for at least 800 000 years.

[The combined] ‘equivalent CO2’ atmospheric concentration [of all GHGs] reached 480 ppm in 2013.
(p 14)

Future climate scenarios for Australia

• [An up to 3-fold] increase in the number of extreme fire-weather days is expected in southern and eastern Australia [by 2015,] with a longer fire season in these regions. …
• The frequency and intensity of extreme daily rainfall is projected to increase. …
• Projected sea-level rise will increase the frequency of extreme sea-level events.

[Between] 1910 to 1990 [Australia] warmed by 0.6°C.
Warming by 2070, compared to 1980 to 1999, is projected to be

• 1.0 to 2.5°C for low greenhouse gas emissions and
• 2.2 to 5.0°C for high emissions [ie business as usual. …]

Further decreases in average rainfall are expected over southern Australia …
[Consequently, droughts] are expected to become more frequent and severe in southern Australia. …

Reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions would increase the chance of constraining future global warming.
Nonetheless adaptation is required because some warming and associated changes are unavoidable.
(p 15)

State of the Climate 2012

Australian average temperatures over land

Each decade has been warmer than the previous decade since the 1950s. …
[Daily] maximum temperatures have increased by 0.75 °C [and] overnight minimum temperatures have warmed by more than 1.1 °C …
2010 and 2011 were Australia’s coolest years recorded since 2001 due to two consecutive La Niña events. … (p 3)

Oceans

Global-average mean sea level for 2011 was 210 mm above the level in 1880.
Global-average mean sea level rose faster between 1993 and 2011 [3 mm/year] than during the 20th century as a whole [1.7 mm/year.]
(p 6)

State of the Climate 2010

Since 1960 the mean temperature in Australia has increased by about 0.7°C. …
Some areas have experienced warming since 1960 of up to 0.4 °C per decade [3 times the global average] resulting in total warming over the five decades of 1.5 to 2ºC.
(p 1)

Prosperity Without Growth 4

Sustainable Development Commission

Adam Smith (1723 – 1790):
A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life …
But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is presumed, no body can well fall into without extreme bad conduct.
(The Wealth of Nations, 1779)

Amartya Sen:
[To lead a] life without shame [is] to be able to visit and entertain one’s friends, to keep track of what is going on and what others are talking about … requires a more expensive bundle of goods and services in a society that is generally richer …
(The Living Standard)

Gerhard Bosch:
One of the fundamental preconditions for the working time policy pursued in Germany and Denmark … was a stable and relatively equal earning distribution.

Governance for Prosperity

[That it is legitimate] for the state to intervene in … the social logic of consumerism is far less problematic than [it is generally] portrayed.
[The] task is to identify (and correct) those aspects of [the] social structure which [incentivize] materialistic individualism and [by so doing] undermine the potential for a shared prosperity. …
[Balancing] individual freedoms against the social good.
[Exercising] prudent choices … between the present and the future. …

[To] prevent ourselves from trading away [long-term wellbeing for] short-term pleasures, society has evolved a [range] of 'commitment devices': social and institutional mechanisms which [tip] the balance of choice away from the present and in favour of the future. …

[Affluence has progressively eroded and undermined] these commitment devices [through] the relentless pursuit of novelty [and increasing] family breakdown and [declining community trust has been the result].
(p 95, italics added)

[The current schizophrenia of the state has been induced by an] unsustainable macroeconomics.
[To heal both itself, and society more broadly, government must:]

1. develop and [implement] a robust macro-economics for sustainability
2. redress the damaging and unsustainable social logic of consumerism [and]
3. establish meaningful resource and environmental limits on economic activity.

(p 99)

Contents

Macroeconomics for Sustainability

Flourishing Within Limits

Governance for Prosperity

Tim Jackson (1957)

Director, Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity (CUSP).

• Prosperity without growth?, Sustainable Development Commission, 30 March 2009.
  
  

  Macro-Economics For Sustainability

  
  Growth induces technological efficiency as well as increases in scale.
  [To] achieve environmental goals [efficiency needs] to outrun … scale.
  [However, it] shows no signs of doing so. …
  
  [A kind] of macroeconomics is [needed] in which stability no longer relies on ever-increasing consumption growth. …
  
  
  

  Changing the 'Engine of Growth'

  
  … American academic Robert Ayres argues that

  [A] new growth engine is needed, based on non-polluting energy sources and selling nonmaterial services, not polluting products.

  [A model which reduces] the requirement for personal ownership, [improves] the utilisation of capital resources and [lowers] the material intensity of the economy. …
  Growth continues, while resource throughput declines.
  
  [The] founding concept [of this model] is the production and sale of de-materialised ‘services’, rather than material products.
  [Not] the ‘service-based economies’ that have … been achieved [in the advanced economies] by reducing manufacturing, [while] continuing to import consumption goods from abroad and expanding the financial sector to pay for it.
  (p 76)
  
  [But] can you really make enough money from these activities to keep an economy growing?
  [We] just don’t know.
  [That we have never] lived in such an economy … doesn’t mean we couldn’t.
  [However, the structural and psychosocial dynamics of growth] don’t seem amenable to [this kind of] moderation …
  Social logic, questions of scale, and the laws of thermodynamics are [significant stumbling blocks to] continued growth with drastic reductions in material intensity. …
  
  [What about a] steady state economy [in which] a constant stock of physical capital [is] maintained by a low rate of material throughput that lies within the regenerative and assimilative capacities of the ecosystem?
  [How would we] establish economic stability under these conditions?
  We have no model for how common macro-economic ‘aggregates’ (production, consumption, investment, trade, capital stock, public spending, labour, money supply and so on) behave when capital doesn’t accumulate.
  Nor do [existing] models properly account for the dependency of [these] aggregates on ecological variables [resource use, reserves, emissions and ecological integrity].
  
  In short, there is [currently] no macro-economics for sustainability …
  (p 77)
  
  
  

  Macro-economic basics

  
  The expenditure-based GDP [‘aggregate demand’] is made up from private consumer expenditure, public (government) expenditure, gross investment in fixed capital and net exports.
  
  The economy is said to be in equilibrium when the aggregate demand matches the aggregate supply ['national income'].
  [National] income is estimated through a ‘production function’ [ie] how much [an economy can produce] with any given input of the factors of production [capital, labour and technological efficiency]. …
  
  [This] form of production function [takes no] account of material resources and [assumes] that it’s possible to substitute different factors of production indefinitely.
  One way of rectifying this would be to include energy (or other material resources) explicitly within the production function and also to constrain substitution possibilities. …
  
  No attention is paid in the GDP to the costs associated with the degradation of natural capital from economic activity, either through the impacts of environmental emissions or through the depletion of natural resources.
  [By contrast all kinds of things] are included in the GDP [that are detrimental to human wellbeing such as: congestion, oil spills, and car accidents].
  (p 78)
  
  Is [there a configuration of] conventional macro-economic variables [that would] reduce the imperative for growth and yet maintain economic stability?
  (p 79)
  
  
  

  In search of the low-growth economy

  
  [What] kinds of assumptions and policy interventions distinguish the ‘Collapse’ scenario … from the ‘Resilience’ [scenario?]
  
  The most influential factors are changes to investment and the structure of the labour market.
  Net business investment is reduced … and there has been a shift in investment from private to public goods, implemented through changes in taxation and public spending.
  The labour force has been stabilised, partly through demographic change and partly through [stabilisation of] the overall population.
  
  [Unemployment is avoided] by reducing both the total and the average number of working hours [and sharing the work equally across the workforce]. …
  Labour productivity is assumed to increase. …
  Reducing the working week is the simplest and most often cited structural solution to the challenge of maintaining full employment with non-increasing output.
  (p 80)
  
  [Economists] Simone d’Alessandro and Tommaso Luzzati [have explored] the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy.
  
  [Such a] transition [would] require substantial [and balanced] new investment. …
  If we invest too slowly, we run out of resources before alternatives are in place.
  Fuel prices soar and economies crash.
  If we invest too fast, there’s a risk of slowing down the economy to the extent that the resources required for further investment aren’t available.
  [There] is a narrow ‘sustainability window’ through which the economy must pass …
  
  Crucially … this 'sustainability window' is widened if the balance between consumption and investment in the economy is changed.
  [If] the savings ratio is increased and more of the national income is allocated to investment, the flexibility to achieve the transition is higher …
  
  
  

  Beyond the consumption-driven economy

  
  Public sector spending is often regarded as a ‘necessary evil’ [for correcting market] failures [and providing] a basic [social] safety net …
  Investment is needed now, [not] to stimulate ever higher levels of consumption in the future, but to … effect the transition to renewable energy and to deliver key environmental and social goals.
  [The] public sector, far from being a ‘distortion’ of the free market, has an absolutely crucial role to play in …
  • protecting macro-economic stability,
  • delivering public goods,
  • investing in and managing long-term infrastructure assets, and
  • co-creating the climate for sustainable consumption …
  (p 81)
  
  [New] macro-economic variables [need to be brought into play] to reflect
  • the energy and resource dependency of the economy [and]
  the value of environmental services or stocks of natural capital. …
  [It is likely that the] balance between consumption and investment [between the] public and private [sectors], the role of different sectors, [and] the nature of productivity improvement, the conditions of profitability [will all need to be renegotiated. …]
  
  The traditional function of investment [to boost labour productivity] is likely to diminish in importance.
  Innovation will [need to be targeted] towards sustainability goals. …
  • resource productivity,
  • renewable energy,
  • clean technology,
  • green business,
  • climate adaptation and
  • ecosystem maintenance and protection. …
  
  [The] nature and scale of investment for sustainability is very different [from driving up productivity in order to stimulate consumption]. …
  [Some] investments in renewable energy [require] much longer time frames than traditional financial markets expect.
  [Investments] in ecosystem protection and maintenance might not bring conventional financial returns at all, even though they are protecting vital ecosystem services [and] contributing to employment. …
  
  Simplistic prescriptions in which investment contributes to future productivity won’t work here. …
  Investment in long-term infrastructures and public goods will have to be judged against different criteria. …
  [For example, investments] in ecosystem maintenance [may] appear to ‘soak up’ income without increasing economic output. …
  In a conventional growth-based economy this is problematic.
  In a sustainable economy this kind of investment [is] an essential component of macro-economic structure.
  [At] the moment, the tools to analyse this dynamic properly don’t exist, even if the political will to implement such a strategy were in place.
  (p 82)
  
  A sustainable economy must be capable of
  • resisting … exogenous shocks and [avoiding] the internal contradictions [that caused the recent financial] chaos …
  • [addressing] distributional equity,
  • [imposing] sustainable levels of resource throughput, and
  • [providing] for the protection of critical natural capital.
  (p 83)
  
  
  

  Flourishing — Within Limits

  
  

  Social recession

  
  [Western] society appears to be in the grip of a ‘social recession’ [marked by]
  • rising rates of anxiety, [depression and problem drinking] …
  • [declining] morale at work …
  • [a] breakdown of community …
  • a loss of trust across society and
  • rising political apathy. …
  
  [For the political left] the main culprit is the increasing commoditization of public goods and the rising social inequalities that are engendered by capitalism itself.
  [For the political right] it is the overbearing influence of ‘big’ government …
  
  [One reason] for the breakdown in trust [is] the erosion of geographical community.
  A study by Sheffield University [revealed that while incomes] doubled [over a 30 year period their] ‘loneliness index’ increased in every single region measured. …

  [Even] the weakest communities in 1971 were stronger than any community now.

  The increasing number of people living on their own has [several] causes, including a [rise] in the divorce rate …

  … and improved access to transport …

  [Mobility of labour being] one of the requirements for higher productivity in the growth economy.
  (p 86)
  
  
  

  Alternative hedonism

  
  Small scale initiatives … are springing up across the country [in response to a sense] that consumer society has [reached a] point, where materialism is now actively detracting from human wellbeing. …
  
  [There is evidence that] materialistic values such as popularity, image and financial success are psychologically opposed to ‘intrinsic’ values like self-acceptance, affiliation, a sense of belonging in the community.
  [And] that people with higher intrinsic values are both happier and have higher levels of environmental responsibility than those with materialistic values. …
  Some people (up to a quarter of the sample in a recent study) have even accepted a lower income so that they could achieve these goals. …
  
  ‘Voluntary simplicity’ [draws on the teachings of] Mahatma Gandhi who encouraged people to

  live simply, that others might simply live.

  (p 88)
  
  [A survey] in Australia found that 23% of respondents had engaged in some form of downshifting in the five years prior to the study [and] 83% felt that Australians are too materialistic.
  [In the US] 28% had taken some steps to simplify and 62% expressed a willingness to do so.
  (p 88)
  
  
  

  The role of structural change

  
  Examples of the perverse effect of dominant structures are legion:
  • private transport is incentivised over public transport;
  • motorists are prioritised over pedestrians;
  • energy supply is subsidised and protected, while demand management is often chaotic and expensive;
  • waste disposal is cheap, economically and behaviourally; [while] recycling demands time and effort …
  • business salaries are higher than those in the public sector …
  • nurses and those in the caring professions are consistently lower paid;
  • private investment is written down at high discount rates making long-term costs invisible …
  (p 89)
  
  These kinds of asymmetry [penalise] pro-environmental behaviour, and making it all but impossible even for highly-motivated people to act sustainably without personal sacrifice. …
  [It is because of these structural barriers that] changing the social logic of consumption cannot simply be [left to] individual choice.
  
  [Two kinds of structural changes are needed] to address the social logic of [consumerism:]
  
  1. [Dismantling the] incentives for unsustainable (and unproductive) status competition.
  2. [Establishing] new structures that provide capabilities for people to flourish [in less materialistic ways, and to] participate [more] fully in the life of society, .
  Social innovation [must be balanced against] continuity and cohesion …
  (p 90)
  
  [More] unequal societies systematically report higher levels of distress than more equal [ones]. …
  
  [Greater] recognition for those engaged in child-care, care for the elderly or disabled and volunteer work would shift the balance … away from status competition and towards a more cooperative [and] altruistic society.
  
  Increased investment in public goods and social infrastructure [fosters] economic resilience [while sending] a powerful signal about the balance between private interests and the public good. …
  
  A less materialistic society will be a happier one.
  A more equal society will be a less anxious one.
  Greater … participation in the life of society will reduce [loneliness and anomie].
  Enhanced investment in public goods will provide lasting returns to the nation’s prosperity.
  (p 91)
  
  
  

  Governance For Prosperity

  
  Two specific components of change have been identified.
  
  The first … is the need to develop a new macro-economics for sustainability. …
  A resilient economy – capable of resisting external shocks, maintaining people’s livelihoods, and living within our ecological means …
  
  The second … in shifting the social logic of consumerism …
  [Providing] capabilities for people to participate fully in the life of society, without recourse to unsustainable material accumulation and unproductive status competition.
  
  Making these changes may well be the biggest challenge ever faced by human society. …
  
  
  

  The role of government

  
  [Governments] intervene constantly in the social context, whether they like it or [not:]
  (p 94)
  • by the way in which education is structured,
  • by the importance accorded to economic indicators,
  • by public sector performance indicators,
  • by procurement policies,
  • by the impact of planning guidelines on public and social spaces,
  • by the influence of wage policy on the work-life balance,
  • by the impact of employment policy on economic mobility (and hence on family structure and stability),
  • by the effect of trading standards on consumer behaviour,
  • by the degree of regulation of advertising and the media, and
  • by the support offered to community initiatives and faith groups. …
  (p 95)
  
  
  

  Selfishness and altruism

  
  [Each] society strikes the balance between altruism ["self-transcendence"] and selfishness ["self-enhancement"] and [between novelty and tradition].
  When … self-enhancement and novelty [predominate], then selfish sensation-seeking behaviors prevail over … altruistic ones.
  Where social structures favor altruism and tradition, self-transcending behaviors are rewarded and selfish behaviour may even be penalized. …
  
  [Do] the institutions that characterize modern society … promote competition or cooperation?
  Do they reward self-serving behaviour or [sacrificing one's] own gain to serve others? …
  
  The individualistic pursuit of novelty [is the key driver of the] consumption growth [upon which] economic stability depends …
  The erosion of commitment [is both] a structural requirement for growth [and] a structural consequence of affluence. …
  
  
  

  Varieties of capitalism

  
  Liberal market economies (specifically the UK, the USA, Canada and Australia) led the march towards competition and deregulation, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s.
  Coordinated market economies (such as Japan, Germany, Austria and the Scandinavian countries) depend more heavily on strategic interactions between firms – rather than competition – to coordinate economic behaviour. …
  
  [It is] in liberalised market economies [that inequality tends to be higher and where, in recent years,] savings rates have fallen [dramatically while] consumer debt has soared.
  … Germany [on the other hand, has struggled with] the opposite problem [- trying] to persuade its citizens to save less and consume more.
  (p 96)
  
  [Liberalised] market economies tend to have:
  • higher per capita carbon emissions,
  • higher infant mortality,
  • higher teenage pregnancies and
  • a greater percentage of people reporting that they ‘feel like an outsider’.
  [However, there] is some suggestion that the distinctions between liberalised and coordinated market economies are not as profound as they were through the 1980s and 1990s [and neither variety of] capitalism is immune from the … global recession.
  [Ultimately, both are dependent on] the pursuit of economic growth. …
  
  
  

  The conflicted state

  
  The principal role of government is to ensure that long-term public goods are not undermined by short-term private interests.
  [And yet] governments across the world [have championed] the pursuit of individual freedoms [coupled with the] expansion of the market into [all] areas of people’s lives.
  (p 97)
  
  [Paradoxically, the] UK, one of the most fiercely liberal market economies, has also been a vociferous [proponent] of sustainability, social justice and climate change policy. …
  [With] one hand to [encouraging] consumer freedoms that lead to growth, [while simultaneously using] the other to protect social goods and defend ecological limits. …
  [It is because of its] responsibility to protect jobs and to ensure stability, [that] the state is bound (under current conditions) to prioritize economic growth … even as it seeks to promote sustainability and the common good.
  Government itself … is caught in the dilemma of growth.
  
  [Without] strong leadership, change will be impossible.
  Individuals are too [susceptible] to social signals and status competition.
  Businesses operate under market [imperatives].
  [Any transition] from narrow self-interest to [pro-social] behaviors …
  [From] relentless novelty to [considered conservation … would be contingent upon structural] changes … that strengthen commitment and encourage social behaviour.
  [Only government has the capacity to institute such changes.] …
  
  [The] state is society’s commitment device, par excellence …
  [The principal agent for securing] shared prosperity. …
  [This role] entails shifting the balance of existing institutions and structures away from materialistic individualism [and towards] real opportunities for people to pursue intrinsic goals of family, friendship and community. …
  [Releasing] the macro-economy from the structural requirement for consumption growth [would] simultaneously free government to [deliver] social and environmental goods and [protect] long-term interests.
  [This common goal is essential to both] a macro-economics of sustainability [and] a governance for prosperity.
  (p 98)
  
  [The current schizophrenia of the state has been induced by an] unsustainable macroeconomics.
  [To heal both itself, and society more broadly, government must:]
  1. develop and [implement] a robust macro-economics for sustainability
  2. redress the damaging and unsustainable social logic of consumerism [and]
  3. establish meaningful resource and environmental limits on economic activity.
  (p 99)

Prosperity Without Growth 2

Sustainable Development Commission

The Economist:
[By] making it easier for households and businesses to get credit, deregulation contributed to economic growth.

Contents

The Age of Irresponsibility

Redefining Prosperity

The Dilemma of Growth

Tim Jackson (1957)

Director, Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity (CUSP).

• Prosperity without growth?, Sustainable Development Commission, 30 March 2009.
  
  

  The Age of Irresponsibility

  
  The banking crisis of 2008 led the world to the brink of financial disaster and shook the dominant economic model to its foundations.
  
  
  

  In Search of Villains

  
  The most prominent villain was taken to be subprime lending in the US housing market. …
  
  A dramatic rise in basic commodity prices during 2007 and early 2008 … contributed to economic slowdown by squeezing company margins and reducing discretionary spending.
  (p 21)
  
  [In] mid-2008, advanced economies were facing the prospect of ‘stagflation’ … for the first time in thirty years.
  Oil prices doubled in the year to July 2008, while food prices rose by 66%, sparking civil unrest in some poorer nations.
  
  By the end of October 2008, governments across the world had committed a staggering $7 trillion of public money — over three times the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the UK — to securitise risky assets, underwrite threatened savings and recapitalise failing banks.
  No one pretended that this was anything other than a short-term and deeply regressive solution.
  A temporary fix that rewarded those responsible for the crisis at the expense of the taxpayer … excused [only] on the grounds that the alternative was simply unthinkable.
  Collapse of the financial markets would have led to [the bankrupting entire nations]. …
  The humanitarian cost … would have been enormous.
  (p 20)
  
  [In 2008] Goldman Sachs paid out $2.6 billion in end of year … bonuses in spite of its $6 billion dollar bailout by the US government …
  
  [The] responses [to the crisis] were seen as short-term interventions, designed to facilitate the restoration of business as usual.
  Short-selling was suspended for six months, rather than banned.
  The part-nationalisation of financial institutions was justified on the basis that shares would be sold back to the private sector as soon as reasonably possible.
  The capping of executive remuneration was ‘performance related’. …
  (p 21)
  
  The growth imperative [was] at least partly responsible for the loosening of regulations, the over-extension of credit and the proliferation of unmanageable (and unstable) financial derivatives.
  
  
  

  The Labyrinth of Debt

  
  [The] unprecedented consumption growth between 1990 and 2007 was fueled by a massive expansion of credit and increasing levels of debt. …
  
  [For] one part of the global economy to be highly indebted, another part must be saving hard. …
  The savings rate in China during 2008 was around 25% of disposable income, while in India it was even higher at 37%.
  There were … clear differences between the so-called ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ market economies’, with the former typically showing higher levels of consumer indebtedness than the latter. …
  
  Personal debt in the UK more than doubled in less than a decade. …
  [By] the end of 2008, the cumulative personal debt still stood at almost £1.5 trillion, higher than the GDP for the second year running. …
  During the first quarter of 2008, the household savings ratio in the UK fell below zero for the first time in four decades.
  (p 22)
  
  

  BOX 2
  
  

  Debt in Perspective

  
  Debt rises in two ways:

  • firstly by borrowing more money (e.g. for increased public spending); and
  • secondly through interest accumulated on the debt. …

  By participating in the economy both as savers and as borrowers, people can try and balance their financial liabilities (money borrowed) against their financial assets (money lent).
  The extent to which it ‘matters’ how much debt we hold depends (in part) on this balance between assets and liabilities [and,] as the current crisis has shown, on the financial reliability of the assets.
  
  
  [Private / Personal] Debt
  
  Personal … or consumer debt is the amount of money owed by private citizens. …
  Personal debt in the UK … at the end of 2008 [was] dominated by home loans [comprising] 84% of total.
  [As] the value of homes continued to rise people’s financial liabilities (home loans) were offset by the value of their physical assets (homes).
  Problems arise when house values collapse.
  
  
  [Public / National] Debt
  
  The national (or public sector) debt is the money the government owes to the private sector. …
  
  Increased debt is a common feature of public finances during recession. [Servicing] this debt — without compromising public services — [can be achieved] in only three ways.
  
  

  1. [By] achieving the desired aim of growth.
  2. [By] increasing the tax rate.
  3. [By] using the debt to invest in productive assets with positive returns to the public purse.

  
  A continually rising public debt in a shrinking economy is a recipe for disaster.
  
  
  External Debt
  
  The total debt held outside the country by government, business and households …
  The sustainability of this debt depends on [among other factors]

  • the extent to which it is balanced by external ‘assets’,
  • the form of both assets and liabilities (including the currency in which they are held) and
  • the relative strength of domestic currency on the international market.

  Particular pressure is placed on an economy when its economy is shrinking and its currency is losing value.
  In extreme circumstances, a country may find itself unable to attract investors willing to support its spending and unable to liquidate its assets to compensate for this.
  At this point the level of external debt relative to the GDP becomes critical.
  Calling in debts worth almost five times the national income (as in the UK) would be catastrophic.

  (p 23)
  
  People are encouraged into debt by … the desire for social status and the drive to boost high street sales.
  But when this strategy becomes unstable … it places large sections of the population at risk of lasting financial hardship [— mainly] the lower income groups who profited [least] from the last two decades of growth. …
  
  France, Germany, Canada and the US all have public sector debts above 60% of GDP.
  Italy and Japan hold public sector debts that are higher than their GDP.
  Norway by contrast holds no public debt at all …
  
  In the UK, public sector debt rose sharply through the financial crisis [due to the need] to protect the banks and fund economic recovery [— pushing the projected] national debt to almost 60% of GDP by 2010.
  
  Public sector debt is not in itself a bad thing [if it] includes money saved by its own citizens. …
  But when the household savings rate collapses … a country [must borrow] from outside its own boundaries [exposing it] to the volatility of international markets.
  (p 24)
  
  External debt varied widely across nations … during 2007/8, from as little as 5% of GDP (in China and India for example) to over 900% of GDP (in Ireland).
  In the UK, the gross external debt increased seven and a half times in the space of just two decades.
  By the end of 2008, it was equivalent to almost five times the GDP and ranked as the second highest absolute level of external debt in the world after the US.
  
  These external liabilities were set off — at least in part — by a higher than usual level of external assets. …
  
  [This] position was deliberately courted by the UK in its role as an international centre of finance. …
  (p 25)
  
  [The] roots of the crisis lie at least in part in a concerted effort to free up credit for economic expansion across the world.
  … George Soros traces the emergence of … a ‘super-bubble’ in global financial markets to a series of economic policies to increase liquidity as a way of stimulating demand.
  Loosening restraints on the US Federal Reserve, de-regulating financial markets and promoting the securitisation of debts through complex financial derivatives were … deliberate interventions [designed] to promote economic growth.
  
  
  

  The Enemy Within

  
  Securitisation of mortgage debts (for example) was championed at the highest level, spearheaded by Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve. …
  In testimony to US Congress in late October 2008, Greenspan admitted to being ‘shocked’ that markets hadn’t worked as expected. …
  
  For over two decades, deregulation of financial markets was championed under monetarism as the best way to stimulate demand.
  The monetarists may have been reacting against the levels of public debt incurred by Keynesian spending programmes in the 1970s.
  But a strategy that ended up replacing public debt with private debt was always a risky one.
  [Indeed, when the bubble burst, even the injection] an estimated $7 trillion of taxpayers’ money proved insufficient to guarantee stability and avoid recession. …
  
  [The] ‘age of irresponsibility’ is not about casual oversight … individual greed [or] malpractice in selected parts of the banking sector. …
  [The] credit crisis and the ensuing recession were part of a systemic failure in the current economic paradigm …
  (p 26)
  
  The natural rate of decline in established oil fields is now believed to be as high as 9% a year. …
  
  Economic expansion in China and [other] emerging economies has accelerated the demand for fossil fuels, metals, and non-metallic minerals …
  [Competition] for land between food and biofuels [is driving up] food prices.
  [Accelerating] environmental impacts [include:]
  • rising carbon emissions,
  • declining biodiversity,
  • rampant deforestation,
  • collapsing fish stocks,
  • declining water supplies and
  • degraded soils.
  The age of irresponsibility demonstrates … our inability
  • to regulate financial markets …
  • to protect natural resources [and]
  • [to] curtail ecological damage.
  Our ecological debts are as unstable as our financial debts. …
  
  Prosperity today means nothing if it undermines the conditions on which prosperity tomorrow depends.
  (p 27)
  
  
  

  Redefining Prosperity

  
  Prosperity has [material,] social and psychological dimensions. …
  
  Amartya Sen … set out the [three] distinctions [in his] landmark essay [‘the living standard’ in 1984:]
  • [Opulence;]
  • [Utility;]
  • [Capabilities] for flourishing.
  (p 30)
  
  
  

  Figure 5: Factors influencing subjective wellbeing (happiness)
  Partner/spouse and family relationships	47%
  Health	24%
  A nice place to live	8%
  Money and financial situation	7%
  Religious/spiritual life	6%
  Community and Friends	5%
  Work fulfilment	2%
  Don’t know/other	1%

  
  
  
  

  Prosperity as Opulence

  
  Opulence refers to the ready availability and steady throughput of material commodities. …
  
  The ‘diminishing marginal utility’ of goods … reflects the fact that [after a certain point] having more of something usually provides less additional satisfaction. …
  
  When you’ve had no food for months … any food at all is a blessing.
  [Whereas, when] the American style fridge-freezer is already stuffed with overwhelming choice [further consumption is just a recipe for] obesity and ill-health …
  
  ([This] offers a strong humanitarian argument for redistribution.}
  
  
  

  Prosperity as Utility

  
  Rather than focusing on the sheer volume of commodities available to us, this … version relates prosperity to the satisfactions which commodities provide.
  (p 31)
  
  In the immediate post-war years, it was a challenge to provide for basic necessities, even in the most affluent nations.
  
  Today, consumer goods and services increasingly furnish us with identity, experience, a sense of belonging, perhaps even meaning and a sense of hope …
  
  Measuring utility in these circumstances is … difficult. …
  Economics [assumes] value is equivalent to the price people are prepared to pay for them [—] utility as the monetary value of market exchanges.
  [Total spending as measured by GDP] is taken as a proxy for utility.
  There is [however] a huge literature critiquing the value of GDP as a wellbeing measure [eg] its failure to account for non-market services (like household or voluntary labour) or negative utilities (externalities) like pollution.
  
  Some have argued that the … concept of utility as exchange value is … flawed.
  A key finding … is the so-called happiness or life-satisfaction paradox. …
  Real income per head has tripled in the US since 1950, but the percentage of people reporting themselves very happy has barely increased at all, and has declined since the mid-1970s.
  In Japan, there has been little change in life-satisfaction over several decades.
  In the UK the percentage reporting themselves 'very happy' declined from 52% in 1957 to 36% today, even though real incomes have more than doubled.
  
  [Above] about $15,000 per capita … the life-satisfaction score barely responds at all even to quite large increases in GDp …
  [Strikingly,] Denmark, Sweden, Ireland and New Zealand all have higher levels of life-satisfaction than the USA, but significantly lower income levels.
  
  By contrast, at very low incomes [a] small increase in GDP leads to a big rise in life satisfaction. …
  It is in … poorer countries that growth really does make a difference.
  [For] richer countries the returns on further growth appear much more limited.
  [Again,] marginal utility … diminishes rapidly at higher income levels.
  
  [On] this analysis … happiness-based [measures] of utility and an expenditure-based [measures] of utility behave in very different ways.
  (p 32)
  
  [The] two measures presume fundamentally different concepts of utility.
  (p 33)
  
  [To] equate prosperity with happiness goes against our experience of what it means to live well.
  People can be unhappy for all sorts of reasons, some of them genetic, even when things do go well.
  Equally, they may be undernourished, poorly housed, with no prospect of improvement and yet declare themselves … completely content …
  
  
  

  Prosperity as Capabilities for Flourishing

  
  Sen [argues for a] living standard based on the capabilities that people have to flourish.
  [How] well people are able to function in any given [context?]
  • Are they well nourished?
  • Are they free from avoidable morbidity?
  • Do they live long? …
    
  • Can they take part in the life of the community?
  • Can they appear in public without shame and without feeling disgraced?
  • Can they find worthwhile jobs?
  • Can they keep themselves warm?
  • Can they use their school education?
  • Can they visit friends and relations if they choose?
  
  In his later work, Sen [stressed] not so much the functionings themselves … as the capabilities or freedoms they have to do so [— that] people should have the right to choose whether or not to participate in society.
  Nonetheless, there are some clear reasons to retain the central importance of functionings themselves.
  
  In the first place [any] attempt to operationalise this idea of development ends up needing to specify what the important functionings are.
  [And even] when it is the freedom to function that people value most … this is largely because the functionings themselves are valued too.
  
  [Secondly, one must not] take the focus on freedom too far.
  In a [finite world] certain kinds of freedoms are either impossible or immoral.
  [Eg the] freedom …
  • to [endlessly] accumulate material goods …
  • to achieve social recognition at the expense of child labour in the supply chain,
  • to find meaningful work at the expense of a collapse in biodiversity, or
  • to participate in the life of the community at the expense of future generations …
  
  
  

  Bounded Capabilities

  
  Capabilities for flourishing … needs to be interpreted … as a range of ‘bounded capabilities’ to live well — within certain clearly defined limits. …
  
  The first [of these] is the finite nature of the ecological resources [upon] which life on earth [depends].
  [These include:]
  • … material ones [—] fossil fuels, minerals, timber, water, land …
  • … the regenerative capacity of ecosystems,
  • the diversity of species and
  • the integrity of the atmosphere, [soil and ocean]. …
  
  The second … is the scale of the global population. …
  
  A prosperous society can only be conceived as one in which people everywhere have the capability to flourish in certain basic ways.
  
  Deciding on those basic ‘entitlements’ is not a trivial task. …
  Physical and mental health matter.
  Educational and democratic entitlements …
  Trust, security and a sense of community …
  Relationships, meaningful employment, and
  the ability to participate in the life of society [all] appear to be important almost everywhere. …
  
  The challenge for society is to create the conditions in which these basic entitlements are possible.
  (p 35-5)
  
  
  

  The Dilemma Of Growth

  
  [In] defence of economic growth.
  • [Opulence] is a necessary condition for flourishing.
  • [Economic] growth is closely correlated with certain basic entitlements — for health or education … that are essential to prosperity.
  • [Growth] is functional in maintaining economic and social stability.
  
  
  

  Material Opulence as a Condition of Flourishing

  
  Why is it that material commodities continue to be so important to us, long past the point at which material needs are met? …
  [We] imbue material [objects] with social and psychological [meaning.]
  Consumer goods provide a symbolic language [with] which we communicate [about] family, friendship, sense of belonging, community, identity, social status, meaning and purpose in life.
  (p 38)
  
  The importance of income in wellbeing is largely played out (within nations) through relative effects.
  What matters — more than the absolute level of income — is having more or less than those around us. …
  
  Healthy life expectancy for English females was 16 years higher for those in the top decile in the late 1990s than it was for those in the bottom decile.
  (p 39)
  
  The population as a whole gets richer.
  Some people are better off than others and positions in society may change.
  But overall this positional competition adds little or nothing to the levels of wellbeing in the nation.
  
  [Perhaps a society] in which social positioning is either less important or signalled differently — could change things.
  We would need to confront the social logic that conspires to lock people into positional competition [and] identify less materialistic ways for people to participate in the life of society.
  [These] strategies could allow us to … reduce our dependency on material growth.
  
  
  

  Income and Basic Entitlements

  
  [Life expectancies are] as low as 40 years in parts of Africa and almost double that in many developed nations.
  (p 41)
  
  As income rises, the additional benefits in terms of increased life expectancy are reduced. …
  
  Chile (with an average annual income of $12,000) has a life expectancy of 78.3 years, greater than that of Denmark (whose average income is almost three times higher at $34,000).
  [While others] with incomes in the same range as Chile (South Africa and Botswana, for instance) [have life expectancies] 30 years lower. …
  
  In sub-Saharan Africa, 18% of children die before their fifth birthday, whereas in OECD countries, the proportion is 0.6%. …
  Infant mortality in Cuba is six deaths per 1000 live births, as low as it is in the US — [despite] an average per capita income of $6,000 enjoy [or] less than 15% of the income enjoyed by Americans.
  [Other] countries with an average income somewhat higher than $6,000 per capita [have] infant mortality rates … much worse than those in Cuba [e.g.] Equatorial Guinea … with a per capita income of $8,000 and [an] infant mortality of 123 deaths per 1000 live births.
  
  [Some] low income countries [achieve] educational participation rates that are as high as the most developed nations.
  Kazakhstan, with in average income of less than $8,000, scores higher on the index than Japan, Switzerland or the US, countries with income levels four and five times higher.
  [Yet there are other] countries with income levels of $8,000 whose educational participation rates are only two-thirds of those in most developed nations.
  (p 42)
  
  [As] incomes grow beyond about $15,000 per capita the returns to growth diminish substantially. …
  
  Three or four different modes of development emerge. …
  
  In the UK … life expectancy has increased quite gradually but very consistently over the last few decades in spite of short periods of recession.
  Japan … was hit quite severely during the Asian crisis in the late 1990s and suffered a prolonged period of economic turbulence [—] yet life expectancy subsequently increased faster than at any time in the preceding two decades. …
  
  In Argentina … economic output has been highly erratic over the last three decades, but the gains in life expectancy have been substantial and consistent.
  
  In Russia … life expectancy remained more or less constant between 1970 and 1989 but fell by 6% following the collapse of the Soviet Union [and continued to decline] even after the economy started to recover.
  (p 43)
  
  [Across] Africa since 1990 [there was a] collapse in life expectancy irrespective of growth rates [attributed to AIDS. …]
  
  In Cuba [GDP] collapsed after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989, partly because of the sudden removal of subsidised Soviet oil.
  [Nevertheless] one recent study [found] significant health improvements in the aftermath.
  Calorific intake was reduced by over a third.
  But obesity was halved and the percentage of physically active adults more than doubled.
  Between 1997 and 2002, "there were declines in deaths attributed to
  • diabetes (51%),
  • coronary heart disease (35%) [and]
  • stroke (20%)".
  
  

  Income growth and economic stability

  
  It is clear … that collapsing economies do present a risk of humanitarian loss.
  Economic stability or, at the very least, some form of social resilience, is important for prosperity. …
  
  Some countries — notably Cuba, Japan, Argentina — have been able to ride out quite severe economic turbulence and yet maintain or even enhance national health [while others] have watched life expectancy tumble in the face of economic recession.
  (p 44)
  
  The transition of ex-Soviet states to a market economy was characterised by very profound changes in social structure [including] a collapse in state provision of health and social care. …
  In Cuba … continuing state-led social provision [underpinned] the health improvements that followed the economic collapse.
  [Up to a point humanitarian] loss in the face of economic turbulence … may be more dependent on social structure than on the degree of economic instability …
  
  [The critical question is] whether a growing economy is essential for economic stability.
  
  Continuous improvements in technology mean that more output can be produced for any given input of labour, capital and resources.
  Efficiency improvement stimulates demand by driving down costs [and] fewer people are needed to produce the same [volume of] goods …
  
  As long as the economy grows fast enough to offset this increase in ‘labour productivity’, there isn’t a problem. …
  [But if] the economy slows for any reason — whether through a decline in consumer confidence, through commodity price shocks, or through a managed attempt to reduce consumption — then … improved labour productivity leads to unemployment [and a recessionary spiral of] diminished spending power [and falling] consumer confidence and … demand …
  
  Social costs rise with higher unemployment.
  [Tax] revenues decline [risking] cuts to public services.
  
  Governments must borrow more … to maintain public spending [and stimulate demand thereby increasing] the national debt.
  [A debt that needs to be serviced] in a declining economy. …
  
  [If demand recovers] and it’s possible to begin paying off the debt.
  It took Britain almost half a century to pay off public debts accumulated through the Second World War.
  The Institute for Fiscal Studies has estimated that the ‘debt overhang’ from the current crisis could last into the 2030s.
  [If] the debt accumulates and the economy fails to recover, the country is doomed to bankruptcy. …
  
  {[As] long as the economy is growing, positive feedback mechanisms tend to push this system towards further growth.}
  Once the economy starts to falter, feedback mechanisms that had once contributed to expansion begin to work in the opposite direction [and the system is driven towards a potentially damaging collapse …]
  With a growing (and aging) population these dangers are exacerbated.
  Higher levels of growth are required to protect the same level of average income and to provide sufficient revenues for (increased) health and social costs.
  (p 45)
  
  [The existing macroeconomic] model has no easy route to a steady-state position.
  Its natural dynamics push it towards one of two states: expansion or collapse.
  
  [The horns, then, of the ‘dilemma of growth’ are:]
  • Growth is unsustainable [due to accelerating] resource consumption and rising environmental costs …
  • ‘De-growth’ is unstable [because of declining] consumer demand leads to rising unemployment, falling competitiveness and a spiral of recession.
  The failure to [confront this dilemma] is the single biggest threat to sustainability that we face.
  (p 46)

British Broadcasting Corporation

Green Army: Communications

(Small girl looking at a New Home, New Life book in Afghanistan)

Edmund Burke (1729 – 97):
One of the first and most leading principles on which the commonwealth and the laws are consecrated is, lest the temporary possessors … unmindful of what they have received from their ancestors or of what is due to their posterity, should act as if they were the entire masters …
[That] they should not think it among their rights to … commit waste on the inheritance by destroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their society, hazarding to leave to those who come after them a ruin instead of an habitation …
(Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790)

Yo Hayek:
Legend has it that, at her first cabinet meeting as Prime Minister in 1979, Margaret Thatcher thumped a copy of Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty on the table declaring:

This is what we believe!

Deeds Not Words

(Jimmy Sime, Emmeline Pankhurst is arrested outside Buckingham Palace, 1914)




(Emily Davison fatally injured by the King's Horse at the Epsom Derby, British Pathé, 1913)




(The Utopia Girls: How Women Won The Vote, ABC Television, June 2012)

Alistair Cooke (1908 – 2004)

I myself think I recognize [in America] several of the symptoms that Edward Gibbon saw so acutely in the decline of Rome …

• a love of show and luxury;
• a widening gap between the very rich and the very poor;
• the exercise of military might remote from the centers of power;
• an obsession with sex;
• freakishness in the Arts masquerading as originality and enthusiasm pretending to creativeness; and
• a general desire to live off the state: whether it's
  • a junkie on welfare; or
  • a government subsidized airline. …

[In 1972, I] made the point that, in the welfare state, too many of us expect a handout, a government subsidy, big daddy will provide.
But I didn't think, so soon, we would elect a president in protest against this liberal system that we've come to take for granted. …

[As] for our rage to believe that we've found the secret of liberty in general permissiveness from the cradle on, I can only recall the saying of a wise Frenchman:

Liberty is the luxury of self-discipline.

And, historically, those peoples that did not discipline themselves had it thrust on them from outside …

As I see it, in this country, … the race is on between

• its decadence, and
• its vitality …

(The More Abundant Life, Alistair Cooke's America, Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1973 / 2002)

Would you like to know more?

Shandi: Indian For Matilda

There was a young girl in [the Indian radio drama] Taru called Shandi [who] goes to her mother and says:
"Hey Mom, can I have a birthday like my little brother?"
And her mother explains:
"In our caste, in our society, girls don't have birthdays."
… Shandi is a very precocious, persistent young girl [so] she goes to her grandmother and says,

Grandmother, can I please have a birthday like my little brother?

Grandmother goes:

No, we don't do that.

[Finally Shandi] meets Taru [who] has come back to village [to work] in the health care sector …
[She's] from a different caste, she's a little bit more educated, and she [gives] Shandi the answer she wants to hear:
"Yes Shandi, let's make you a birthday party."
Over the next 10 episodes, the 250 million people of Bihar, hear something they've never heard before.
They hear about a girl choosing what cake she wants.
They hear about invitations going out.
They hear about presents.
And finally … Shandi has her birthday party. …

[A] month later, two months later, across Bihar, little girls are having birthday parties.
No just one, but you have whole villages, that are committing, and signing up for,
"We will treat our boys and our girls equally."
[Shandi] showed people the power of a persistent young girl; and, through Taru [they] learnt the power of being able to change. …